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ABSTRACT: The paper focuses on the concepts of virtue and 
self-knowledge in Alcibiades I and Aeschines’ Alcibiades, which are 
marked by striking similarities in the way they discuss these themes 
and their interconnection. First of all, in both dialogues the notions 
of ἀμαθία and ἀρετή seem to be connected and both are bound 
up with the issue of εὐδαιμονία: Socrates points out that ἀρετή 
is the only source of true εὐδαιμονία and encourages Alcibiades to 
acquire it, stressing the need for a constant ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ. 
Thus, another common feature is the Socratic exhortation to pursue 
and achieve moral virtue, which is identified as a form of knowledge. 
Ultimately, in both accounts the chief means by which to contrast 
ἀμαθία is found in the care and knowledge of the self. The above 
arguments are to be considered within the particular frame of the 
paideutic relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades, which is 
itself portrayed in similar terms in the two texts. In both dialogues, 
the relationship is characterized as a form of erotic education and, 
moreover, Socrates himself links his paideutic activity to divine will. 
Yet, only in Aeschines’ Alcibiades does this explicitly entail the idea 
that Socrates transmits virtue without resorting to any τέχνη or 
ἐπιστήμη. So while in both cases ἀρετή is understood as a kind 
of knowledge, in Aeschines’ Alcibiades there seems to be a greater 
tension between this concept of virtue and its modes of transmis-
sion, which are “anepistemic”.
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RESUMO: O artigo focaliza os conceitos de virtude e auto-
conhecimento no Primeiro Alcibíades e no Alcibíades e Ésquine, 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the 
concepts of virtue and self-knowledge in Alcibiades 
I and Aeschines’ Alcibiades, through a comparative 
analysis which seeks to highlight analogies, differ-
ences and possible intertextual references between 
the two works. In order to do so, the analysis will be 
especially focused on some fundamental passages.
Striking similarities between the two dia-
logues were first noted by Dittmar, who interpreted 
them in his 1912 commentary as evidence for Alcibi-
ades I’s dependence on Aeschines’ work
1
. According 
to Dittmar, the author of Alcibiades I  – which, in 
his opinion, is a spurious dialogue written between 
340 and 330 BC
2
 – draws heavily on Aeschines’ text; 
he does so, in particular, for all the themes that 
are not discussed in chapter 4, 2 of Memorabilia, 
the second chief source of his work.  My primary 
aim in this paper is to show that the most striking 
parallels between the two dialogues are to be found 
with regard to the themes of virtue and knowledge, 
and in particular the close connection between the 
two. Leaving aside the controversial issue of the 
authenticity of Alcibiades I
3
, I will not focus on the 
problem whether the thesis Socrates expounds here 
conflicts or not with what is said in Plato’s other 
dialogues
4
. Such a problem falls beyond the scope of 
this study, which is meant to outline the relation-
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Antiquity as an introduction 
to Platonic thought (see 
Olympiodorus, In Alcibiadem 
10.17-11.6 and Proclus, 
In Alcibiadem Prooim. 
11.15-17). Nonetheless, 
the authenticity of the 
dialogue has been debated 
at length by scholars: see, 
among others, Clark 1955, 
Arrighetti 2000, 21-29; 
Smith 2004, 93-97 and 
Renaud 2007, 226-229.
4. According to Smith, 
the strongest evidence 
against the authenticity 
of the dialogue is to be 
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inconsistency between some 
passages of Alcibiades I 
and other doctrines we find 
elsewhere in the Platonic 
corpus: see Smith 2004, 
100-106.
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ship between the two works with respect to these 
specific topics. Moreover, I will not be referring here 
to the most controversial sections of the dialogue 
(133c8-17 and 134d1-e7), the ones which have most 
been discussed in the debate on the authenticity of 
the text and which are typically invoked by those 
interpreters who consider the work spurious – since 
they are likely the result of a later interpolation. 
The central importance of the issues of virtue 
and knowledge for Aeschines’ Alcibiades clearly 
emerges from a passage by Maximus of Tyre and a 
fragment of P. Oxy. 1608 col. I, which provide a 
good starting point for my investigation.
Maxim. Tyr. philosoph. VI 6: But the true punishment 
of Alcibiades was far more ancient, originating from 
a more ancient law and more ancient judges. When 
he left the Lyceum, was condemned by Socrates, and 
proscribed by philosophy, then Alcibiades was exiled, 
then he was taken prisoner. O bitter condemnation, 
implacable execration, and lamentable wandering! The 
Athenians, indeed, afterwards entreating received him; 
but philosophy, science and virtue remain inaccessible 
and irreconcileable to those whom they have once 
exiled. Such, then, is science, and such is ignorance 
(φιλοσοφία δέ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀρετὴ τοῖς 
ἅπαξ φεύγουσιν ἄβατος μένει καὶ ἀδιάλλακτος. 
τοιοῦτον ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τοιοῦτον ἡ ἀμαθία; transl. 
by T. Taylor).
P. Oxy. 1608 col. I fr. 1: “[…] to behave towards 
your parents as Themistocles is said to have behaved 
towards his own?”. “Please, speak kindly to me”, replied 
Alcibiades. “Is it necessary, according to you, that men 
do not know music before they become musicians, or 
that they’re ignorant about horse-riding before they 
become able to ride?”.  
Both passages point to the relevance of the 
themes of virtue and knowledge in the dialogue 
and the second one, in particular, shows their close 
interconnection (φιλοσοφία δέ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ 
ἀρετὴ). Furthermore, the two texts introduce rel-
evant elements for a comparative reading of Alcibi-
ades I. First, both disclose the strong link between 
the discussion of the above topics and the paideutic 
relationship between Socrates and the young man. 
Hence, it is within the framework of this relationship 
and according to its goals that the themes of virtue 
and knowledge find a place in Aeschines’ dialogue. 
Secondly, the fragment from of P. Oxy. 1608 col. I 
outlines some fundamental methodological aspects, 
as it brings up the issue of Socrates’ elenctic ap-
proach. Indeed, the first part of the fragment seems 
to be the conclusion of an objection raised against 
Themistocles for his behavior towards his parents. 
As Rossetti and Esposito
5
 have noted in their study 
on the two Papyri from Oxyrhynchus, this suggests 
that Socrates – against the backdrop of one of 
the crucial themes of the dialogue, the need for 
education – had developed a series of ἔλεγχοι by 
choosing the figure of Themistocles as a model. 
Presumably, Alcibiades had dared to state that he 
was in no respect inferior to the great politician, 
leading Socrates to draw his attention on the limits 
5. See Rossetti-Esposito 1984, 
27-29.
que são marcados por notáveis similaridades na maneira 
como discutem estes temas e suas interrelações. Em primeiro 
lugar, nos dois diálogos as noções de ἀμαθία e ἀρετή 
parecem estar relacionadas e ambas estão ligadas à questão 
da εὐδαιμονία: Sócrates assinala que a ἀρετή é a única 
fonte da verdadeira εὐδαιμονία e encoraja Alcibíades a 
adquiri-la, ressaltando a necessidade de uma constante 
ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ. Assim, outra característica comum é 
a exortação socrática para perseguir e obter a virtude moral, 
a qual é identificada como uma forma de conhecimento. 
Por fim, em ambas as exposições o principal meio pelo qual 
contrastar a ἀμαθία é encontrado no cuidado e no conhe-
cimento do eu. Os argumentos acima devem ser considerados 
dentro da estrutura particular da relação paidêutica entre 
Sócrates e Alcibíades, que é ela mesma retratada em termos 
similares nos dois textos. Em ambos os diálogos, a relação é 
caracterizada como uma forma de educação erótica e, além 
disso, o próprio Sócrates vincula sua atividade paidêutica à 
vontade divina. Todavia, somente no Alcibíades de Ésquine 
isto explicitamente implica a ideia que Sócrates transmite a 
virtude sem recorrer a qualquer τέχνη ou ἐπιστήμη. Assim, 
enquanto em ambos os casos a ἀρετή é entendida como um 
tipo de conhecimento, no Alcibíades de Ésquine parece haver 
uma tensão maior entre este conceito de virtude e seus modos 
de transmissão, que são “anepistêmicos”.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Sócrates, Alcibíades, virtude, co-
nhecimento, paideia. 
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of this figure, starting with the observation that 
Alcibiades had been disinherited (see P. Oxy. 1608 
col. I fr. 4). Socrates would seem to have drawn a 
provocative analogy – intended to serve as a moral 
exhortation – between Themistocles’ destiny and 
Alcibiades’ condition
6
, in such a way as to force the 
latter to contradict himself and call into question 
his previous statements. Alcibiades’ answer («Please, 
speak kindly to me») suggests that Socrates’ con-
cealed exhortation has achieved its goal: Alcibiades 
finds himself at a loss for words. This, perhaps, is 
the reason why Socrates sharply changes the topic 
of the conversation and switches to the issue of the 
need for education and learning for all those who 
wish to acquire skills in a specific field
7
, be it music 
or horse-riding. In this way, the theme of knowledge 
is brought up in the conversation.
The above picture may further be enriched 
by examining two passages by Cicero (tusc. disp. 
III 32,77) and Augustine (de civ. Dei XIV 8.3) that 
more clearly illustrate the Socratic method and its 
effects. These passages describe the process by 
which Socrates leads Alcibiades to acknowledge his 
own ἀμαθία and the need for παιδεία and ἀρετή. 
Cicer. tusc. disp. III 32,77: For what shall we say – 
seeing that Socrates, as we are told, convinced Alcibiades 
that he was in no true sense a man (eum nihil hominis 
esse) and that there was no difference, for all his high 
position (summo loco natum), between him and any 
poor porter (quemvis baiolum), whereupon Alcibiades 
was much distressed and implored Socrates with tears to 
teach him virtue and drive baseness away (ut sibi virtutem 
traderet turpitudinemque depelleret), – what shall we say, 
Cleanthes? Surely not that there was no evil in the cause 
which made Alcibiades feel distress? (transl. by J. E. King).
August. de civ. Dei. XIV 8.3: A story in point is re-
lated about Alcibiades, if I am not mistaken about the 
man’s name. For though he considered himself happy 
(beatus), he burst into tears, we are told, when Socrates 
in a discussion proved him how wretched he was (quam 
miser esset) since he was foolish (quoniam stultus). In 
this case then foolishness (stultitia) was the cause of 
this useful and desiderable grief (utilis optandaeque 
tristitiae), the grief of a man who regrets that he is what 
he ought not to be (transl. by P. Levine).
According to Cicero’s account, Socrates de-
monstrates to Alcibiades how unworthy he is and 
that in spite of his noble birth he does not differ 
from your average baiolus, that is to say: from a 
δημιουργός. Thus Alcibiades, in tears, begs So-
crates to free him from turpitudo and – this being 
the crucial point – to teach him virtus. The parallel 
passage by Augustine completes this picture and 
enriches it with new elements. Alcibiades, accor-
ding to this source, considered himself to be happy 
(beatus), before Socrates made him aware of being 
miser, i.e. wretched because stultus. As in Cicero’s 
account, the young man bursts into tears.
Both sources can be combined in order to cre-
ate a unitary picture: Alcibiades, aware and proud of 
his noble birth, believes that this is a good enough 
reason for him to be filled with happiness. Socrates, 
however, at the end of an elenctic procedure that is 
not reported, shows Alcibiades just how wretched 
(ἄθλιος) he actually is, because true happiness is 
firmly based on the possession of virtue (ἀρετή) and 
Alcibiades has no knowledge of this (he is ἀμαθής). 
As a consequence, Alcibiades is quite worthless 
and does not differ from a δημιουργός. Now, with 
regard to this last assertion it is possible to draw 
a first parallel with Alcibiades I, where the same 
connection between ἀμαθής and δημιουργός 
can be found. Indeed, in 131a Socrates first states 
that «no physician, in so far as he is a physician, 
knows himself, nor does any trainer, in so far as he 
is a trainer»; he then goes on to add: 
«And fa rmers,  and c ra f t smen genera l l y 
(οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ), are far from knowing the-
mselves (γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτούς). For these people, 
it would seem, do not even know their own things, but 
only things still more remote than their own things, in 
respect of the arts which they follow; since they know 
but the things of the body, with which it is tended»
 
.
Even aside from this first analogy, the ensuing 
discussion between Socrates and Alcibiades reveals 
further and deeper similarities. The text clearly 
shows that the kind of knowledge that δημιουργοὶ 
utterly lack is the self-knowledge and awareness 
of one’s own ignorance whose relevance Socrates 
6. While the text is corrupt, this 
is what the very opening of the 
fragment seems to suggest: «[…] 
to behave towards your parents 
as Themistocles is said to have 
behaved towards his own?».
7. On this topic see Grenfell 
1918, 20.
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had stressed from the beginning of the conversa-
tion (117b-118b). I will not address the issue of 
the theoretical foundation of self-knowledge and 
its possible identification with the notion of self-
consciousness, nor the issues pertaining to the 
so-called “paradigm of vision” and the metaphor 
of the mirror. For these issues in turn raise a series 
of problems that have widely been debated among 
scholars
8
 but which lie outside the purpose of this 
paper. In particular, these problems are connected 
to the interpretation of the “self”, whether in an 
individual or impersonal sense, as well as to that 
of the structure of the soul and of the relation 
between that part of the soul «which is the seat 
of knowledge and thought» (133c) and the deity. 
The point at issue is that self-knowledge – whose 
“self” is to be identified with ψυχή – is defined 
as σωφροσύνη in 131b4; as a consequence, no 
one who belongs to the δημιουργοί, who lack 
precisely this kind of knowledge, can be regarded as 
a σώφρων (131b). Indeed, σωφροσύνη – which 
according to Bearzi implies «un senso di saggezza 
tanto morale che intellettuale»
 
, is conceived as a 
form of self-knowlege and as preparatory to the 
practice of “taking pains over oneself”, since it is 
the knowledge of one’s own limits.
Further down in the dialogue Socrates sets 
out from the above assertion, which serves as the 
premise of a long chain of arguments (133c-135c) 
through which he leads Alcibiades to recognize 
that only virtue becomes a free man, while «vice 
is a thing that becomes a slave» (δουλοπρεπὲς 
ἄρ’ ἡ κακία; 135c). Socrates starts precisely with 
the claim that «self-knowledge we admitted to be 
temperance» (133c) and from this point onwards 
the dialogue between Socrates and Alcibiades 
reaches some significant conclusions. First, a man 
who does not know will make mistakes and so he 
will do ill both in private and in public; as a conse-
quence – and this is the first conclusion – he will be 
wretched (ἄθλιος; 134a), since «it is impossible to 
be happy if one is not temperate and good» (οὐκ 
ἄρα οἷόν τε, ἐὰν μή τις σώφρων καὶ ἀγαθὸς ᾖ, 
εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; 134a). It necessarily follows as a 
corollary that «it is the bad men who are wretched» 
(οἱ ἄρα κακοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄθλιοι) as only 
temperance, not wealth, can free from wretchedness 
(134b). At this point Socrates, who thus far has 
spoken about σωφροσύνη, explicitly introduces 
the concept of ἀρετή: if Alcibiades is to manage 
the city’s affairs properly and honorably, he must 
impart ἀρετή to its citizens; but as it is impos-
sible to impart a thing that one has not, he must 
first «acquire virtue himself» (κτητέον ἀρετήν, 
134b-c)
9
. Thanks to this slight change of terms
10
, 
Socrates formulates the same thesis again, but this 
time directly connects ἀρετή and εὐδαιμονία, so 
that the former becomes the precondition for the 
latter. As the effect of the lack of virtue in a state 
or a despotic regime is κακῶς πράττειν (135a), 
then – Socrates emphasizes once more –  «it is not 
despotic power, my admirable Alcibiades, that you 
ought to secure either to yourself or to the state, if 
you would be happy, but virtue» (135b). Switching 
from the state to the individual, Socrates draws the 
last conclusion from his reasoning: the lack of virtue 
becomes a slave; virtue, instead, «becomes a free 
man» (ἐλευθεροπρεπὲς δὲ ἡ ἀρετή; 135c). After 
claiming that the man who lacks virtue is not only 
ἄθλιος, but also δουλοπρεπής, Socrates leads 
Alcibiades to the conclusion that he is on the same 
side as slaves (135c)
11
.  
A striking consonance between the two works 
begins to emerge by now. Both in Aeschines’ Alcibi-
ades and in Alcibiades I the notion of ἀμαθία and 
that of ἀρετή seem to be interconnected and both 
are bound up with the issue of εὐδαιμονία. The 
idea shared by both dialogues is the following. As 
Cicero’s and Augustine’s accounts show, according 
to Aeschines’ Socrates there is no εὐδαιμονία 
without ἀρετή and this is why Alcibiades is 
actually ἄθλιος (miser), although he considers 
himself εὐδαίμων (beatus); his ἀθλιότης origi-
nates from his ἀμαθία. Similarly, in Alcibiades I 
Socrates puts forward the idea that the one «who 
does not know», the ἀμαθής, is ἄθλιος, whereas 
only the σώφρων καὶ ἀγαθὸς can be happy 
(134a-b). Moreover, as Alcibiades – according to 
Cicero – begs Socrates to teach him virtus, we may 
suppose that Socrates had previously encouraged 
the young man to pursue virtue and that he had 
tried to persuade him of the need to achieve it in 
8. See esp. Soulez-Luccioni 1974, 
Bearzi 1995, Brancacci 1997, 
Renaud 2007, Napolitano Valditara 
2007, and Palumbo 2010.
9. On the issue of the preliminary 
knowledge required of politicians, 
see also Plat. Prot. 319c and 320b.
10. The identity of the two 
concepts is not demonstrated. The 
idea is not found in Aeschines’ 
dialogue and might come from  
Protagoras (330b), as Dittmar 
suggests (see Dittmar 1912, 142).
11. See Xen. Mem. IV 2, 40, 
where Euthydemus states that he 
considers himself a δοῦλος.
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order to be filled with happiness. This is precisely 
what he does in Alcibiades I, where he explicitly 
claims that the one who wishes to be happy must 
ἀρετὴν παρασκευάζεσθαι (135b). 
Now, it is possible to further extend this 
analogy. It is worth stressing that the ἀμαθία at 
issue in Alcibiades I does not concern the knowledge 
of «the things of the body» (131b) – as Socrates 
clearly states – because this is the kind of knowledge 
δημιουργοὶ possess. Rather, it concerns some fun-
damental moral notions (δίκαιον, ἄδικον, καλόν, 
αἰσχρόν, κακόν, ἀγαθὸν; 117a-b; see 118a and 
Mem. IV 2, 20-23). Alcibiades’ ignorance of these 
notions is all the more serious not only because 
they represent «the greatest matters» (τὰ μέγιστα; 
118a), but also – and especially – because Alcibiades 
is in the grip of the «deepest» ignorance (ἀμαθίᾳ 
τῇ ἐσχάτῃ; 118b): he believe he knows what he 
actually does not; that is to say, he lacks the self-
knowledge advocated in the Delphic maxim (130e). 
Thus, if Socrates leads Alcibiades to acknowledge 
that he is not εὐδαίμων, since he has no knowl-
edge of such relevant moral notions, it follows that 
Alcibiades had based his opinion on the possession 
of external goods. This is precisely what Socrates 
accuses Alcibiades of in his first speech (104a-c). 
Alcibiades’ φρόνημα is based first of all on his 
beauty – on his awareness of being «foremost in 
beauty and stature» (κάλλιστός τε καὶ μέγιστος; 
104a). Secondly – and this is an element that is 
dealt with in detail – Alcibiades is proud of his 
eminent γένος, of the fact that he belongs to the 
most famous family of the city and has Pericles as 
his guardian (104a-b; see Charm. 157d ff.); finally, 
Socrates mentions Alcibiades’ wealth, although this 
is not the good he takes greatest pride in (104b-c). 
It is now possible to draw a series of parallels 
with Aeschines’ Alcibiades. First, in this dialogue 
too Alcibiades may have grounded his high opinion 
of himself on the possession of external goods and 
especially his noble birth – the fact that, as Cicero 
states, he was, summo loco natus. Secondly, Alcibi-
ades expresses his own sense of superiority in the 
disdainful statement – recorded by Aelius Aristides 
(de quatt. 575) – that «no one was of any value» 
according to him:  a position that can be compared 
to a passage of Alcibiades I (104a), where Socrates 
blames Alcibiades for his overconfidence of having 
«no need of any man in any matter» (μηδενὸς 
δεῖσθαι). Thirdly, this remark is in line with the dis-
dain for πολιτικοί expressed by Alcibiades in 119b: 
as even the city’s politicians have gone into politics 
as amateurs, there is no need «to practise (ἀσκεῖν) 
and have the trouble of learning», because Alcibiades’ 
natural powers alone (τῇ φύσει) are sure to give him 
an easy victory over these men
12
. Another passage by 
Aelius Aristides suggests that in Aeschines’ dialogue 
too Alcibiades must have expounded the idea that 
his φύσις was sufficient to provide benefits to his 
city, or at least that he must have more generally 
referred to the incompetence of πολιτικοί. Indeed, 
Aelius Aristides reports that Socrates did not «make 
it a matter of consolation for him (scil. Alcibiades) 
that he does not alone cohabit with ignorance (τῇ 
ἀμαθίᾳ συνοικεῖν), but that everyone who is a 
politician in the city is also in the same condition» 
(de quatt. 576-7; transl. by C.A. Behr).
A sharper examination of the issue can be 
carried out by considering some additional passages 
from Aelius Aristides (de quatt. 348-9), who reports 
the speech on Themistocles that according to Ae-
schines Socrates made in the presence of Alcibiades. 
First of all, the words of Socrates at the beginning 
of the passage are closely reminiscent of P. Oxy. 
1608 col. I fr. 1, mentioned above: «Since you have 
dared to attack the life of Themistocles, consider 
the sort of man whom you thought that you must 
censure» (Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους 
βίου ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι ἐτόλμησας, σκέψαι οἵῳ 
ἀνδρὶ ἐπιτιμᾶν ἠξίωσας). Whereas according to 
the previous source  – as we have seen (supra, 2) – 
Alcibiades had declared that he was in no respect 
inferior to the victor of Salamis, here he goes so 
far as to reproach the great politician, as Socrates’ 
words suggest. The issue of knowledge, however, 
only explicitly arises in the conversation in two 
later sections. After turning Alcibiades’ attention 
to Themistocles’ valor on the battlefield and to his 
merits in the eyes of the Athenians, Socrates states:
Ael. Aristid. de quatt. 348: And Themistocles was 
not disheartened by the present circumstances because 
12. The issue whether politicians 
are great φύσει or μαθήσει 
is debated by also Plato in the 
Protagoras (319e ff.) and by 
Xenophon in Memorabilia (IV 2).
70 
the Greek’s position was far deficient in number of ships, 
infantry and money, while the king’s was superior; but 
he knew that unless the king would surpass him in good 
advice, the other things, although so numerous, would 
not help him much. And he recognized that it was 
usual that that side prove superior (κρείττω) which 
had men more earnest in virtue (σπουδαιότεροι ἐν 
ἀρετῇ) in charge of their affairs. And then the king 
perceived that his position was weaker, on the day in 
which he met a man who was more earnest than he (ᾗ 
ἡμέρᾳ ἀνδρὶ ἑαυτοῦ σπουδαιοτέρῳ ἐνέτυχεν; 
transl. by C.A. Behr).
At the end of another praise of Themistocles’ 
strategic skills and outstanding valor – such that 
no other man could «justly be cited as having the 
greatest power (μέγιστον δύνασθαι)» – the moral 
exhortation implied becomes clear:
Then consider, Alcibiades, that even for such a man 
knowledge, although so great (ἡ ἐπιστήμη τοσαύτη 
οὖσα), was not enough to avoid expulsion or disfran-
chisement by his city, but was insufficient. What then do 
you think it would be for bad men who take no care of 
themselves (ἐν μηδεμιᾷ ἐπιμελείᾳ ἑαυτῶν οὖσιν)? 
It is not remarkable if they can even be successful in 
small matters? (ibid.).
Furthermore, it is worth noting that Socrates 
explicitly ascribes all of Themistocles’ achievements 
to his ἐπιστήμη, not his τύχη: « I attribute to 
that man knowledge as the cause of all his acts 
and I think that no fate had been responsible for 
these deeds» (προστίθημι ἐκείνῳ ἐπιστήμην 
πάντων ὧν ἔπραττεν καὶ μηδεμίαν οἴομαι 
τύχην αἰτίαν τούτων τῶν ἔργων γεγενῆσθαι). 
A set of crucial concepts emerges from 
Socrates’ speech – σπουδαιότης ἐν ἀρετῇ, 
ἐπιστήμη and ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ – which con-
firms the relevance of the themes of virtue and 
knowledge and, at the same time, allows us to draw 
a further analogy with Alcibiades I. Here, the theme 
of “taking care of oneself” is not only clearly dealt 
with by Socrates – who asks Alcibiades τί ἐστιν τὸ 
ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (127e) – but also reveals a 
close connection to the issue of (self-) knowledge, 
in so far as the latter is the necessary condition for 
the former. Indeed, Socratic questioning comes to 
the conclusion that «if we have that knowledge, 
we are like to know what pains to take over our-
selves (γνόντες μὲν αὐτὸ τάχ᾽ ἂν γνοῖμεν 
τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν); but if we have it 
not, we never can» (129a). And this taking care of 
oneself essentially corresponds to the taking care of 
one’s own soul, since the inquiry has revealed that 
neither the body nor the combination of body and 
soul is man: for the latter ultimately turns out to 
be nothing else than ψυχή (129b-130c). 
Thus, another common feature can be 
stressed: the Socratic exhortation to pursue and 
achieve moral virtue. Moreover, the latter is iden-
tified in both dialogues as a form of knowledge: 
in Aeschines’ Alcibiades the acquisition of ἀρετὴ 
requires μάθησις and ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ to be 
acquired (see Mem. IV 2, 20); similarly, Alcibiades 
I establishes a close relation between knowledge 
and virtue. Indeed, Socrates advises Alcibiades to 
resort to μάθησις and ἄσκησις τῆς ἀρετῆς as a 
means of countering the negative effects of popular 
approval (132a ff.; see Mem. I 2, 19; 23) and, fur-
thermore, the first part of the dialogue is entirely 
devoted to showing that Alcibiades’ natural dispo-
sitions are insufficient when not combined with 
ἐπιμέλεια, ἄσκησις and σοφία. The latter, in 
particular, is defined as ἡ ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ in 133b10 
and this reveals the crucial role played by knowledge 
in the acquisition of virtue: for only education can 
make gifted young men achieve knowledge about 
moral values and, through it, ἀρετὴ. 
Both works further provide a similar picture 
of the effect of Socratic exhortation on the young 
Alcibiades, who gives up his resistance. With regard 
to Aeschines’ Alcibiades this aspect is evidenced 
not only by the passages from Cicero and Augus-
tine mentioned above, but also by Aelius Aristides, 
who sketches a scene that reappears in several 
other sources. He reports that Socrates compelled 
Alcibiades «to weep with his head on his knees, 
having become disheartened because he had not 
even nearly prepared himself like Themistocles» (de 
quatt. 576). The young man has realized by now just 
how close-minded he had been and how far from 
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Themistocles’ παρασκευή, the need for which he 
had rejected – as we have seen (supra, 6) – in Alcibi-
ades I (119b). Therefore, Alcibiades surrenders to 
Socrates and gives in to his exhortations. The same 
episode is related by Plutarch (quom. adul. ab am. 
intern. 29 p. 69e-f), who writes: «In such manner 
Socrates tried to keep Alcibiades in check, and drew 
an honest tear from his eyes by exposing his faults 
(δάκρυον ἐξῆγεν ἀληθινὸν ἐξελεγχομένου), 
and so turned his heart» (transl. by F. C. Babbitt). 
Aside from the detail of Alcibiades’ tears – also 
featured in Cicero’s account – all sources provide 
much the same depiction of the effect of Socratic 
ἔλεγχος: aporia, confusion and frustration on the 
part of Alcibiades, who gives in to Socrates and 
– according to Cicero – begs him ut sibi virtutem 
traderet turpitudinemque depelleret. 
Now, we can find a comparable display of 
self-awareness on the part of Alcibiades in the last 
section of Alcibiades I. As seen before (supra, 5), 
Socrates – after showing to Alcibiades that «vice is 
a thing that becomes a slave» (135c) – leads the 
young man to acknowledge that his own condition 
is δουλοπρεπής and that he is acting like a slave 
himself. When he feels that Alcibiades is about to 
give in, Socrates sums up the conclusions reached 
by his refutations and directly asks: «And do you 
now perceive how you stand? Are you on the side 
of the free, or not? (ἐλευθεροπρεπῶς ἢ οὔ)?». 
Alcibiades’ answer reveals that the Socratic ἔλεγχος 
has achieved its purpose: «I think I perceive only 
too clearly» (135c). Only at this stage, in the final 
exchanges of the conversation, Alcibiades suddenly 
becomes aware of his condition and ceases to hold 
out against Socrates. From this point onwards, he is 
willing to follow Socrates (135d; see Mem. IV 2, 40) 
and to begin «to take pains over justice» (135e). 
To sum up, the following series of analogies 
have emerged from the passages just examined. 
First of all, the sources agree in their portrayal of 
Alcibiades’ reaction to the Socratic ἔλεγχος: the 
young man, proud of his noble birth and of his 
natural talent, is reticent when faced with Socrates’ 
exhortation to acquire virtue and denies the need for 
ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ with regard to himself. Thus, 
Alcibiades’ firm belief that he is εὐδαίμων – in so 
far as he is endowed with external goods – is taken 
as the starting point in both dialogues. Against 
this opinion, Socrates points out that ἀρετή is the 
only source of true εὐδαιμονία and encourages 
Alcibiades to acquire it, stressing the need for an 
ever-during ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ. Through a long 
chain of stringent ἔλεγχοι, he leads Alcibiades to 
acknowledge his own unsuitableness for his ambi-
tious political goal (see Xen. Mem. IV 2, 30-39). The 
sudden awareness of this condition stirs confusion 
in the young man’s soul and undermines his pride. 
Finally open to moral exhortation, Alcibiades begs 
Socrates to teach him ἀρετή and to free him from 
αἰσχρότης. Ultimately, in both accounts the chief 
means by which to contrast ἀμαθία is found in the 
care and knowledge of the self – the Delphic maxim 
γνῶθι σεαυτόν
13
 which in Alcibiades I becomes a 
sort of “sub-concept” of the more general concept 
of ἐπιμέλεια.
In addition to this set of similarities, a 
further remark may be made before moving toward 
a conclusion. The analysis conducted so far has 
revealed some striking similarities in the discussion 
on knowledge and virtue in the two dialogues, as 
well as a common setting of both themes within 
the framework of the paideutic relationship between 
Socrates and Alcibiades. Now, something more 
may be said about the modalities of transmission 
of virtue and knowledge within Socratic teaching. 
Particularly telling is a passage from Aelius Aristides’ 
De rhetorica:
Ael. Aristid. de rhet. I 61-2: If I thought that I 
could be helpful through my art (τινι τέχνῃ), I should 
find myself guilty of much stupidity. But as it is, I 
thought that this had been granted to me by a divine 
portion in respect to Alcibiades (θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ᾤμην 
μοι τοῦτο δεδόσθαι ἐπ’ Ἀλκιβιάδην). And none 
of this should be wondered at. […] For many of the 
sick become well, some by human art, some by a divine 
portion (θείᾳ μοίρᾳ). Those by human art, cured by 
doctors; those by a divine portion, desire leads to what 
will profit them.
Ibid. 74: Through the love which I had for Alcibiades 
(διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα ὃν ἐτύγχανον ἐρῶν Ἀλκιβιάδου) 
I had felt no different from the Bacchants. For whenever 
13. γνῶθι σεαυτόν is presented 
as a means against ἀμαθία also 
in Mem. IV 2, 24.
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the Bacchants become inspired, they draw milk and ho-
ney from sources where others cannot even draw water. 
And though I knew no study by which I might usefully 
educate a man (οὐδὲν μάθημα ἐπιστάμενος ὃ 
διδάξας ἄνθρωπον ὠφελήσαιμι ἂν), still I thou-
ght that by associating with him I would improve him 
through love (ξυνὼν ἂν ἐκείνῳ διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν βελτίω 
ποιῆσαι; transl. by C.A. Behr)
14
.
The focus of the passage is the distinction 
between two ways by which one can make other 
people better: through μαθήματα and by awak-
ening, through ἔρως, the desire (ἐπιθυμία) to 
pursue virtue. Socrates, we are told, follows the 
latter method. He denies that he possesses any art 
(τέχνη) or science (μάθημα) to benefit other 
people; if Socrates can help, it is only by divine 
dispensation and by the love for Alcibiades, so that 
he believes he can improve the young man διὰ τὸ 
ἐρᾶν, «through love». Indeed, just θείᾳ μοίρᾳ 
he is able to arouse a ἐπιθυμία that he also calls 
ἔρως and that is to be understood as an impulse 
to achieve virtue. 
These remarks may also be read in the light 
of Socrates’ statement in Apology 33a that he «was 
never any one’s teacher» (not even Alcibiades’), 
and – by extension – in the light of the charge 
of corrupting the youth directed against the phi-
losopher, with regard to which he had adopted the 
above position. To this extent, the conversation 
between Socrates and Alcibiades was intended to 
provide an example of Socrates’ relationship with 
the youth of Athens: a relationship based not on 
παίδευσις, but only on συνουσία. What emerges 
here is the idea of a παιδεία which does not consist 
in “teaching” (διδάξας), but in improving other 
people by means of simple “association” (ξυνὼν). 
Indeed, Socrates points out that his educational 
skills originate from a θεία μοῖρα, a “divine por-
tion”; so that the resulting παιδεία is related to 
a form of ἐπιθυμία, a desire that corresponds to 
ἔρως. Ultimately, as A. Stravru states, «in Eschine è 
l’ἐρᾶν nella sua accezione anepistemica, a rendere 
migliore il prossimo grazie all’aiuto esterno di una 
“sorte divina”»
 
. 
This point of view on παιδεία and on the 
transmission of virtue is confirmed by Plutarch’s 
account: 
Plutarch. vit. Alcib. 4 p. 193c-e: And he came to 
think that the work of Socrates was really a kind of 
provision of the gods for the care and salvation of youth 
(θεῶν ὑπηρεσίαν εἰς νέων ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι καὶ 
σωτηρίαν). Thus, by despising himself, admiring his 
friend, loving that friend’s kindly solicitude and revering 
his excellence (αἰσχυνόμενος δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν), he 
acquired an “image of love” (εἴδωλον ἔρωτος), as 
Plato says, “to match love” (ἀντέρωτα), and all were 
amazed to see him eating, exercising, and tenting with 
Socrates, while he was harsh and stubborn with the rest 
of his lovers. Some of these he actually treated with the 
greatest insolence, as, for example, Anytus, the son of 
Anthemion (transl. by B. Perrin).
First, this account too depicts Socrates’ 
philosophical and educational activity as a «provi-
sion of the gods» for the youth, something which 
would appear to confirm Socrates’ claim that he can 
improve Alcibiades only by a θεία μοῖρα, and that 
he does not possess any τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη for 
imparting virtue. Secondly, we find in this passage 
the idea that Alcibiades’ moral improvement is due 
to a sort of “response” to Socratic virtue, which is at 
the same time a paradigm for the young man and the 
source of his feeling of inadequacy. Alcibiades feels 
ashamed when confronted with Socrates’ ἀρετή, 
and this acts as a stimulus for virtue.
Moreover, in Plutarch’s account too this “ex-
change” within the paideutic relationship is framed 
according to the dynamics of ἔρως. The erotic 
connotation of παιδεία is here confirmed: thanks 
to his συνουσία with Socrates, Alcibiades has an 
εἴδωλον ἔρωτος, an “image of love” that must be 
understood – according to the doctrine expounded 
in the Phaedrus (255d), and which Plutarch refers to 
– as the kind of love which reciprocates (ἀντέρως) 
the ἔρως of the lover towards the beloved. Thus, 
once again, Socratic education aims to awaken 
ἐπιθυμία in others: the impulse to achieve virtue 
that is necessary for self-improvement. As in Plato’s 
Symposium (cf. 222a-b), this process occurs through 
14. On the sequence of the 
two fragments in Aeschines’ 
dialogue, see Joyal 1993; on the 
interpretation of the first passage 
see also Meiser 1912.
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the transformation of the beloved into the lover – 
that is to say, by awakening in the ἐρώμενος the 
ἐπιθυμία that becomes an ἐραστής. 
Now, as far as the idea of παιδεία and the 
issue of the transmission of virtue are concerned, 
here too it is possible to single out some relevant 
similarities to Alcibiades I. Most of these are found in 
the opening of the dialogue, where Socrates explains 
to Alcibiades the reason why he has sought him:
Alcib. I, 103a-b: Son of Cleinias, I think it must 
surprise you that I, the first of all your lovers (πρῶτος 
ἐραστής σου), am the only one of them who has not 
given up his suit and thrown you over, and whereas 
they have all pestered you with their conversation I 
have not spoken one word to you for so many years. 
The cause of this has been nothing human (αἴτιον οὐκ 
ἀνθρώπειον), but a certain spiritual opposition (τι 
δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα), of whose power you shall be 
informed at some later time. However, it now opposes 
me no longer, so I have accordingly come to you; and 
I am in good hopes that it will not oppose me again in 
the future. Now I have been observing you all this time, 
and have formed a pretty good notion of your behavior 
to your lovers (πρὸς τοὺς ἐραστὰς): for although 
they were many and high-spirited, everyone of them has 
found your spirit too strong for him and has run away 
(οὐδεὶς ὃς οὐχ ὑπερβληθεὶς τῷ φρονήματι ὑπὸ 
σοῦ πέφευγεν). Let me explain the reason of your 
spirit being too much for them (transl. by W.R.M. Lamb).
What follows this passage is the section I 
previously examined (supra, 6), where Socrates 
displays to Alcibiades the reasons for his φρόνημα. 
The passages shows that also in this case Socrates 
ascribes his educational activity to a “divine will”: 
while in Aeschines’ Alcibiades he found himself in 
love with Alcibiades for a “divine portion” and so 
in the position of improving him διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν, in 
Alcibiades I what allows Socrates to seek Alcibiades 
and encourage him to pursue virtue is the end of 
divine opposition (δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα). Even 
though the deity here manifests itself in a “nega-
tive” way – that is to say, by ceasing to oppose 
Socrates
15
 – in both cases the Socratic educational 
“mission” is due to an αἴτιον οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον. 
This is emphasized by the last reference to the deity 
at the end of the dialogue (135d), where Socrates 
says that ὁ θεός will decide whether Alcibiades’ 
education will be successful or not («if it be God’s 
will»; ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ). Secondly, once again the 
relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades is 
characterized as a lover-beloved relationship, so 
that Socrates’ educational intent arises from his 
ἔρως for Alcibiades. Indeed, Socrates immediately 
introduces himself as Alcibiades’ ἐραστής at the 
beginning of his speech and, a little further on, 
he states: «if I saw you, Alcibiades, content with 
the things I set forth just now, and minded to pass 
your life in enjoying them, I should long ago have 
put away my love (πάλαι ἂν ἀπηλλάγμην τοῦ 
ἔρωτος; 104e)». In such a way, Socrates connects 
his ἔρως for Alcibiades to the possibility of – or 
rather potentiality for – moral improvement on the 
part of the young man. Furthermore, what is particu-
larly telling is that also in Alcibiades I the Socratic 
παιδεία produces a role reversal that leads the 
ἐρώμενος – once the impulse to achieve virtue is 
engendered in him – to be driven by the ἐπιθυμία 
that belongs to lovers. Indeed, in the final section 
of the dialogue, when Alcibiades is finally fully 
open to moral exhortations and willing to achieve 
ἀρετή, he clearly states: «And yet I say this be-
sides, that we are like to make a change in our parts 
(μεταβαλεῖν τὸ σχῆμα), Socrates, so that I shall 
have yours and you mine. For from this day onward 
it must be the case that I am your attendant, and 
you have me always in attendance on you» (135d). 
And Socrates’ answer is even more telling (135e): 
«So my love (ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρως) will be just like a stork; 
for after hatching a winged love in you it is to be 
cherished in return by its nestling (ὑπὸ τούτου 
πάλιν θεραπεύσεται)». One last feature that the 
two portrayals have in common is the depiction of 
the arrogance which Alcibiades shows towards all 
his lovers, except Socrates. This trait, highlighted 
by Plutarch («he was harsh and stubborn with the 
rest of his lovers»), is also mentioned in the open-
ing of Alcibiades I («for although they were many 
and high-spirited, everyone of them has found your 
spirit too strong for him and has run away»; 103b) 
and reiterated by Socrates in the following lines: 
15. This is in line with Plato’s 
interpretation of Socrates’ 
daimonion, as it is described 
in the Apology (31d; 40a), the 
Euthydemus (272e) and the 
Phaedrus (242b-c), where it has a 
merely dissuasive function. On the 
contrary, in Xenophon’s Socratic 
writings the daimonion semeion 
suggests to Socrates both what to 
do and what to avoid: see Mem., I 
1, 2-5; I 4, 15; IV 3, 12; IV 8, 1; 
Apol. 12-13.
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«it is hard for a lover to parley with a man who 
does not yield to lovers (χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν πρὸς 
ἄνδρα οὐχ ἥττονα ἐραστῶν προσφέρεσθαι 
ἐραστῇ; 104e)».
It is now possible to draw some conclusions 
from the investigation conducted thus far, by add-
ing some fundamental differences to the several 
analogies observed. First of all, in both dialogues it 
is possible to note a certain degree of consonance 
regarding the themes of virtue and self-knowledge, 
and the interaction between the two. Both works fo-
cus on the competences required in order to become 
a πολιτικός; however, in Alcibiades I this subject 
is approached through a more detailed discussion of 
self-knowledge and the treatment of the soul, while 
the last passage by Aelius Aristides on Aeschines’ 
Alcibiades – regarding the more general idea of 
βελτίον γίγνεσθαι on Alcibiades’ part – does not 
seem to suggest any in-depth investigation of the 
matter. Rather, the text addresses a wider issue: 
the conditions for true εὐδαιμονία. This is the 
context in which, in both dialogues, the issues of 
virtue and self-knowledge are discussed along much 
the same lines, as already noted. By exposing the 
unfoundedness of Alcibiades’ arrogant claim to hap-
piness based on the possession of external goods, 
Socrates connects these themes to the wider issue 
of the pursuit of εὐδαιμονία, which he identifies 
with ἀρετή. Socrates then defines virtue as a kind 
of knowledge, conveying the idea that ἀρετή is not 
a natural gift, but something which requires exercise 
and committment (παρασκευή in Aeschines), if 
one is to attain any knowledge of the fundamental 
ethical concepts.
The above arguments are to be considered 
within the particular frame of the paideutic relation-
ship between Socrates and Alcibiades, which is itself 
portrayed in similar terms in the two texts. First of 
all, in both dialogues the relationship is character-
ized as a form of erotic education: Socrates, moved 
by his ἔρως towards Alcibiades, presents himself as 
his lover and then transforms his beloved Alcibiades 
into an ἐραστής through his work of education. 
In Aeschines’ dialogue this transformation takes 
place – according to Plutarch – by engendering in 
Alcibiades a “reflection of love” or ἀντέρως, while 
in Alcibiades I Socrates makes the young man go 
through an out-and-out role reversal. In both cases, 
Socrates arouses the necessary ἐπιθυμία aimed 
at moral improvement and the pursuit of virtue. 
Secondly, Socrates himself links his paideutic activ-
ity to divine will; yet only in Aeschines’ Alcibiades 
does this explicitly entail the idea that Socrates 
transmits virtue without resorting to any τέχνη 
or ἐπιστήμη. If, as demonstrated in both cases, 
ἀρετή is considered a kind of knowledge (supra, 
8) – making virtue an issue of ethical intellectual-
ism – in Aeschines’ Alcibiades there seems to be a 
greater tension between this concept of virtue and 
its modes of transmission, which are “anepistemic”. 
According to Alcibiades I, it is still possible to 
conceive of a kind of παιδεία leading to moral 
improvement through συνουσία alone, but only in 
a very general sense; that is is to say: it is possible 
to argue that Alcibiades’ progress towards virtue 
occurs within the framework of – and thanks to – 
Socratic dialogue, but this holds true for most of 
Socrates’ interlocutors in the logoi Sokratikoi. What 
is missing is a clear reference to a kind of paideutic 
activity διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν on the part of Socrates, that 
goes beyond the simple fact that the philosopher 
presents himself as Alcibiades’ lover, or as being 
moved by ἔρως towards him. In other words, it is 
not possible to argue on the basis of the text that 
ἔρως is not only the driving force behind Socrates’ 
educational action and what provides its framework, 
but the actual means for the transmission of virtue.
In conclusion, it is possible to observe that – 
if Dittmar is right in suggesting that Alcibiades I was 
written at least 50 years after Aeschines’ dialogue
16
 
– the author of Alcibiades I was clearly familiar 
with Aeschines’ Alcibiades, as several passages of 
his work clearly betray first-hand knowledge of the 
dialogue. But even if – as Giannantoni suggests 
– we accept the authenticity of Alcibiades I and 
assume a different chronological relation between 
this dialogue and that of Aeschines, there is still a 
strong consonance between two works, which may 
even stem – according to the scholar – from common 
memories
17
. Moreover, some close similarities had 
already been noted by ancient commentators, as 
evidenced by a statement in Aelius Aristides’ Defence 
16. See Dittmar 1912, 174. 
According to his hypothesis, 
Aeschines’ Alcibiades was written 
between 394-393 and 391-390 BC, 
while Alcibiade I was composed 
between 340 and 330 BC.
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of the Four. The author here compares Aeschines’ 
Alcibiades and Alcibiades I, affirming the superiority 
of Aeschines’ Socrates, who was able to bring about 
the transformation of Alcibiades in a different and 
more efficient way. Aelius concludes that «although 
Aeschines was inferior to Plato in other respects, 
somehow he handled this matter in a better way» 
(de quatt. 577; transl. by C.A. Behr). Ultimately, 
then, regardless of our take on the issue of the 
authenticity of Alcibiades I and its chronological 
relation to Aeschines’ work, it is undeniable that 
the two dialogues are marked by striking similarities 
in the way they discuss the themes of virtue and 
knowledge, and their interconnection.
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